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APPLYING THE '"'"PARADOX 'T'IIEORY: A LAW AND
POLICY ANALYSIS OP COLLECriVE BARGAINING
RIGI ITS AND TEACHER EVALUATION REPORM t:-:ROM
SEI~ECTED STATES
1

Mark Paige, ].D., Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION

In 20 II, swtc legislatures across the country passed sweeping
to their collective bargaining statutes. Many aftcctcd the
rights of unions to bargain over personnel issues, such ~1s teacher
evaluations. In bet, in three of the f(mr states analyzed in this Article,
local unions ~md management arc essentially prohibited from
bargaining on the process and substance of teacher evaluations. At
the same time, state bureaucracies have stepped in and increased their
control over teacher evaluations. Restricting union involvement at
the bargaining table is viewed as one way to ensure that school
boards and not unions control public education. In theory, these
changes promote democracy by incrc~1sing the power of elected
representatives while reducing the impact of unclectcd unions.
These st~nutory changes arc ripe for research. Indeed, scholarship
has yet to address the issue of bargaining teacher evaluations in the
context of the recent statutory amendments. This Article analyzes
rd(mllS to legislative changes concerning the process and substance
of teacher evaluations through a law and policy analysis. In hct, this
Article argues that excluding unions from teacher evaluations in
collective bargaining negotiations will actually have the unintended
consequence of impeding rd(m11S and change. This is the paradox;
theoretically, if management has exclusive control over teacher
evaluations, it can implement rd(mns with case, but bccmsc unions
arc excluded from negotiating evaluations, they will f(xus their
resources on disrupting rather than supporting change.
Consequently, this Article proposes a two-tiered solution. Pirst,
statutes should permit districts to bargain teacher evaluations.
Second, the usc of interest-based bargaining ("IBB") should be
~1mcndmcnts

• Assistant l'rotl-ssor, Department of Educ1tional Leadership, Univcrsit\' of Mc!ssaehuserrslhrtmouth; Adjunct l'rokssor, University of ,\1assc!Chusetts School of Law, The clllthor would
like to thank Julie Mead, Todd DCJ'vlitchel1, Marrin Malin, and Bruce J'vlcredith lrlr reading
ecnlicr n-rsions of this Article
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encouraged at the local district level as the preferred negotiation
process. I BB encourages collaboration between management and
unions on a local level, invests teachers in the process, and, thcrd()rc,
increases the probability that changes will be dtcctively implemented
within schools.
This Article is org~mizcd as f()llows. Part II highlights the existing
literature concerning collective bargaining in education. It concludes
with a discussion of the "paradox" theory, the conceptual lens applied
to the issuc. 1 The paradox theory suggests that excluding unions
from policy matters impedes rather than promotes education rd(m11
initiatives and dlcctivc school govcrnancc. 2 Instead, an ~1ppropriatc
legal framework governing teacher evaluations and collective
bargaining would promote collaboration through the f(m11al
barg~1ining process. Part III examines selected legislative changes in
teacher cvalu<ltions from f(mr states: Wisconsin, florida, Michigan,
and New Hampshire. In all but New Hampshire, these changes
encourage the paradox because bargaining teacher cvalu~1tions is now
prohibited. Thus P~1rt IV recommends a two-tiered approach to
avoid the paradox as it relates to teacher evaluations. Lastly, Part V
concludes by summarizing key points and advising legislators how to
avoid the collective bargaining paradox.
II. A REVIEW Of RELEVANT LITERATURE CONCERNING UNIONS
AND EDUCATION: THE Goon, THE BAn, AND TilE PARADOXICAL

This section presents the two general arguments concerning
collective bargaining in public education. On the one hand, scholars
opposed to collective bargaining and unions argue that they arc
costly and antidemocratic. 3 On the other hand, some suggest that
unions ~1rc vehicles for education rd(m11. 4 Additionally, this section
will discuss the classification system used by courts and legislatures to
ddinc each party's bargaining obligations and elaborate on the
paradox of public sector labor law. s

I.
(2009).
2.

3.
4.
S.

Martin H. Malin, The I';Inl<fox oFI'uh!ic Sector
/datl370.

!d at 131l4.
!d. at 1390-9 J.
Malin, supr;~notc I.

/.;~/>or

/.;IW, ll4 biD. L.j. 1369
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APPLYING THE "PARADOX" THEORY
A. Tead1cr Unions: Cost{v Impediments to Rcfimn

Opponents to collective bargaining in education protfcr a
number of arguments. Collective bargaining is expensive because
unions attempt to obtain the highest possible wages and bcndits t(>r
their mcmbcrs. 6 Consequently, districts become trapped in costly
compensation packages.?
Salary schcduks-typiolly part of a
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") -arc structured so that
teachers arc rewarded t(>r seniority, without regard to merit in most
cascs.l' Moreover, public sector employees enjoy costly pension and
health insur~1ncc plans, generally borne by the districts. <J These costs
arc created through CBAs.
Opponents also argue that collective b~1rgaining impedes effective
nunagement of schools. 1 CBAs hamstring school ~1dministrators
attempting to man~1gc schools.! I for example, the length of a
teacher's school day is determined to the minute by the terms of the
CBA.I2 Administrators who attempt to extend the school day t(>r an
occasi01ul event outside of typical school hours (e.g., "family Math
Night") without compensation do so at the peril of a grievance.
Regardless, the argument is that CBAs-a product of negotiationsimpede day-to-day school management.
Unions ~1rc criticized as obstacles to improving teacher quality
because they negotiate contracts that protect incompetent teachers
and sacrifice younger, talented ones. So-called "bumping" rights and
"Reduction in force" ("RIF') clauses arc commonly cited as
impeding teacher quality. 13 U ndcr these provisionS: seniority
determines the order of pcrsonncllayoHs, preserving the employment

°

6. Lab Carr Stedman ct ;11., J)o Teacher Unions 11!/](/cr Fducwima/ l'crfimn;lna·'
rcssons rcuncd limn the State SAT :md ACT Score,·, 70 HARV. Enuc. REV. 437, 441
(2000) (noting that opponents of union involvement in cduution view unions .1s "problem:ltic
beuuse they arc singularly interested in maximizing working conditions and compensation
rather tlun, and ;lt the possible expense ot~ studem gains").
7. Sec. e.g, LORR1\INE M. McDONNFLL & ANTIIONY PASCAL, TFMIIER U:--:1o:--:s
.\Nil EDL!C\TION REHlRM (Rand l<JRX).
X. Steelman ct al., supra note 6, at 442.
<J. .~i.·c Christopher Edwards, l'uhlic .~(·am· Uwims and the Risiii,t; 0Jstl· oFhnpkwcc
C!Hnpmsation, 30 CAro ). I, R7 (Winter 2010).
I 0. Stedman ct al., supra note 6, :lt 441.
II. !d
12. Malin, supr:1notc I, at 13<JO.
13. .~(·c, c.,~.;., Ev:1 Moskowitz, Rrc:1kdown, 6 Fnuc. NEXT (Summer 2006) (t:li<ing issue
with the length :1nd various provisions in contr:lcts :1nd accusing m:1nagcmcnt <llld labor of
"colluding" to pllt :1dult interests over those ofchildrm).
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of some of the older teachers who may have become ineffective.
Consequently, the newest teachers-the future of the district-arc
the first to be laid off. 14 Again, this appears irrational; effectiveness is
not a flctor in the employment decision.! S In sum, labyrinthine
CBAs strangle sound education policy that would otherwise be
implemented by well-intended school administrators.I6 Several
scholars argue that these dlccts result in poor student outcomcs.I7
Others argue that public sector collective bargaining is antidemocratic, as a discrete minority-unions ~md teachers-can
influence an elected public entity. Unions can leverage political
pressure on elected school board otlicials, especially if they ted
slighted at the bargaining table. This sets an ominous backdrop to
any negotiation session; the implicit threat of revenge at the ballot
box by a powcrf\Jl interest group may push elected school board
members to f()ld on a particular issue. Moreover, this is an advantage
not otherwise available to private sector employces.IX Thus, a
minority essentially manages a public asset (public schools) meant f()l·
control by the majority.

B. The Other Side o{the Coin: Unions as Rcfhnnen·
In contrast, some scholars view collective bargaining and unions
fworably. Their art,rtrmcnts arc two-f()ld. first, unions improve
working conditions, and second, teachers advance education rdcm11
through barg~1ining. Both lines of thought imply that the promotion
of teachers' self--interests complements students' best interests.I9
first, unions create conducive workplace environments that, in
turn, benefit stlldcnts. 20 for example, when teachers arc not required
14. lmkcd, the colloquialism <lssociatcd with this dkct is "The last hired is the first
tired."
IS. Steelman ct ell., supra note 6, at 442.
16. Setting aside the academic point, some of these arguments tlut criticize lahvrinthinc
CBAs arc somewhat awkward, as CBAs arc the product of f1(gon:ltions between two parties. In
other words, management agrees to the terms of the CBA.
17. Steelman ct <li., supra note 6, at 442 (citing various scholars who criticize unions on
rhis score).
I X. Benjamin 1.indv, The Impact of" Tcxhcr Collective /J;ug;zimizg Lm~,· on Student
A,-hi<·l·,·mcnt: Fvidcncc
fi"om a New ,\kxiw Nztw:z/ h;pcninmt, 120 Yi\LF.l..). 1130, 1141 (2010).
19. Stcelm<lll et <li., supra note 6, at 442 (summarizing proponents' arguments <ls
!(,]lows: "Taken together, these possible lx·ndits of unions may enhance not onlv the status of
teachers but also the cducltimul climate to which students arc exposed.").
20. !d. (noting the <lrgument that "[ b [etter pw and more secure working conditions

1)
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to be bus monitors or arc given duty-free lunch breaks, they can
devote more energy and time to instructional activities. 21 In this way,
unions permit tc~Khers to improve their teaching, rather than deal
with tangential, "noneducational tasks. " 22 Thus, improving working
conditions may improve schools. 23
Second, some argue that unions arc engines of innov~1tion. 24
Summ~1rizing this point, one scholar noted that unions have
barg~1incd f(>r "mentor programs, peer review procedures, higher
academic standards, Iand I a longer school year," among other
things. 2 S Moreover, unions can be dkctivc conduits f(>r policy
rd(m11, such as in-school financc. 26 Thcrd(>rc, unions add rd(xm
mechanisms that might otherwise be ignored if teachers were not
able to ~Kt as advocates in the negotiation process through union
representation.

C Resolving the Good and Bad:

Third-Par~v Adjudication

The appropriate role of unions in education is contested in reality
and not just in ~Kadcmic debates. Courts, administrative boards, and
legislatures arc repeatedly asked to draw the boundary between the
collective bargaining rights of teachers and the right of the public to
run schools through duly elected oflicials. 27 The essential question
these bodies must resolve is whether or not certain subjects (e.g.,
teacher evaluations) arc exclusively management prerogatives and, in

llla\' attLlCt higher quality tecKhers cllld filster a .sundard of prokssionalism that is conducive to
dkctive te,Khing") (citations omitted).
21, Linch·, SlljJJ:J note IX, clt 1143 (summclrizing various scholars tilr the general
c1rgument that improving teacher working conditions improves educatiotul qtulitv) (citcnions
omitted).
22. 5/:c, e,g, Brian Rowan n aL, lhii1g Resec1rch on 1:/nplm·ces' l'crfimn:Jnce ro Studt·
the Ffkct of' 7£·xhen on Srudmts·' Achievemmt, 70 Soc Of' Enuc, 2S6 (I YY7) (work
situcnion is one bctor that affects teacher perfimnance).
23. !d
24. Steelman et aL, supr;~ note 6, at 442 ("Unions also may encourage more proficient
nutugenKnt cllld 'shock' the svsrem into needed restructuring"). Hut sec :Jim TO!lll A.
DFJ'v!JTCI I ELL, LABOR RELATIONS IN ElllJCi\TIO:c.J: l'OLICIES, !'Ol.I'l'I(:S, Al\ll I'Ri\CTICES YO
(2010) (bc1rgaining rdim11 at the table has a mixed record of success) . .ke :1/m Limh·, SlljJJ:J
note I X, at 1143-44.
2S. Lindv, supr:Jnote I X, at 1143.
26. .~(·c, e.g., Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 3RR (Wis. 2000) (school fin:lllce
challenge where Wisconsin\ largest teacher union, WEAC, intervened as a plaintiff profkring a
number of arguments ultimately adopted hv the Supreme Court in a narrow decision).
27. .~(·c. e.g., Malin, supi:Jnote I, at 13R4-13Yl (a review of court cases concerning this
issue with varving decisions).
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turn, excluded from bargaining. 2X Is the subject related primarily to
employee working conditions and, therctixc, required to be
bargained? Or docs the subject hll somewhere in between? These arc
not easy questions. liT Chicago- Kent College of Law ProtCssor
Martin M~1lin notes the complicated nan1re of the inquiry: "The
problem that labor bo~1rds and courts have had to confront is how to
deal with two potentially extremely broad concepts. At some level,
every decision aflccts conditions of employment, and, at some level,
every decision affects public policy or managerial authority. " 2'>
Courts employ a classification system to resolve these disputes. A
subject's classification determines the parties' obligation, if any, to
bargain it. A subject, and its subparts, can be classified as follows:
nunda tory, permissive, or prohibited. 30 A mandatory subject is one
that primarily relates to employee working conditions. It must be
bargained. A permissive subject is one that docs not primarily relate
to employee working conditions and is not exclusively reserved to
management. It may be bargained. A prohibited subject is one that is
exclusively reserved to management because it relates to
management's control over schools. It cannot be bargained, even if
both sides desire it. As discussed, teacher evaluations arc now
prohibited under amendments to education and bargaining statutes
in several of the states profiled in this Article.
l Iowcvcr, a prohibited subject is not necessarily immune from
union int1uencc due to impact bargaining, by which unions can
negotiate the ctkct of a policy on employee "terms and working
conditions. " 31 Thus, to the extent that an issue (e.g., the process of
teacher evaluations) impacts "terms and working conditions," it is a
mandatory subject of bargaining.3 2 ~or example, some courts have
held that the length of a school day is not a mandatory subject of
2X. Bargaining rights of public employees arc generally creatures of statutes. In stcltes
where permitted, legislatures have enacted public sector labor laws tlut gencrc1lly require a
public entity to bargc1in "terms and conditions of employment." Sec, e.g., N.H. REV. ST.\T.
AN~. § 273-A:3(I) (20 11 ).
2'>. Mellin, supra note I, at 13X5.
30. ld ("I M lost jurisdictions t(>llow the private sector model of dividing subjects of
bargaining into mandatory, permissive, and prohibited."). ,\(·c ;Jlm Martin H. Malin & Charles
Tn·lor Kerchner, Clurrcr School1· ;uu! C!J//cctivc Harg;u/u!J!{: Onnp;Jtihlc ,'vf;un:Jgc or
11/c,!{itim;Jtc R.duion.1hip!, 30 I L\R V. J. L. PUB. Pol :y XXS, <) 13-<J 14 (2007).
31. .kc, e.g., Malin, sup1:1 note 1, at 13<)0 (noting that unions t(>uJs on impclct
barg.1ining as a means to "insulate" its employees ti·om policies that ,Ire impkmcntni without
negoticltions).
32. ld
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bargaining because it is a matter of educational policy.33 I Iowcvcr,
the extended hours of work directly impact a teacher's "terms and
conditions

of employment, "34 and

so the exact hours

and

the

compensation associated with the proposal arc mandatory subjects of

b~1rgaining. In sum, through imp~1ct bargaining, unions maintain
important leverage over a policy implementation even if the policy 1s
classified as prohibited by statute. 35

In New I lampshirc, the subject of teacher evaluations is at least
pcrmissivc. 37 Other examples highlight the variation between states
on the same issue. 3 X Regardless, when a third party rules a subject
prohibited, it typically cites "democratic" concerns. 3<> In other words,
the issue's relationship to the function of the public entity outweighs
considerations of the rights of the public worker.

It

would be

undemocratic to permit union int1ucncc over the desires of an elected
school board.
At first blush, anti-union scholars might be satisfied that the

33. (;n:sham Crc1dc Teachers Ass'n v. (;rcsham Grade Sch. Dist. No.4, 630 1'.2d 1304
Ct. App. l<JXI J.
34. Medin, supn1 note I, at 13X6.
35. This ahilitv has important consequences with respect to the "paradox" efkct,
discussed Jidi:J ..~(·c 1d. at 13<) I.
36. 5(·c. e.g., Malin & Kerchner, supr:l note 30, at <Jl4 (litigation over subjects of
bc1rgaining across st.\tes is an "cKl hoc approach that bcks predictclbility cmd encourages
litigJrion").
37. Appeal of White Mountain Keg'! Sch. Dist., <JOX A.2d 7<)0 (N.H. 2006) (stJtc
supreme court holding thJt tcJcher evJiuJtions is Jt kJst cl permissive subject of bc1rgaining .md
if parties do bargain on the issue during negotiations, thev arc bound to that agreement. The
court declined to rule on the question of whether the issue is mandator\'). Sec :dw Ass'n of
l'ortsmomh Teachcrs/NEA-NH v. l'orrsmotJth Sch. Dist., Dec No. 200X-02S (N.H. l'ub.
Emp. Labor Relations Bd.) (feb IS, 200X) (impact bc1rgaining of teacher evaluation is J
mandatory su bjcct of bargaining, provided unions do not .lttempt to control the process).
3X. Sec lvblin, supr:l note I, clt 13X7 (noting tlut different courts have variouslv
cbssificd cbss size, school ulcndar, drug testing, among other issues).
3<J. .~(·c, e.g., Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W.2d X37, X41
(S.D. I <)74) (prohibiting bargaining over teacher preparation periods, teacher con!Crcnce
scheduling, :md usc of instructional aides on the grounds that negotiations should nor intcrkrc
with the duties of elected representatives). A New Hampshire statlltc expresses the lcgisbti\'l·
sentiment on this issue. A prohibited subject of barg:1ining is one that t:llls under a "mamgcrial
policv exception." N.H. REV. STAT. AN~. § 273-A: I (XI) (2011) (this term "shall be
construed to include but shc1ll not be limited to the timctions, programs ami methods of the
public cmplovcr, including the usc of tcclmology, the public cmpluvcr\ organizational
structure, c111d the selection, direction and number of its personnel, so c1s to continue public
e<>ntn>l ofg<>vcrnmental hmctiuns").
(Or.
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majority of states profiled in this Article now prohibit bargaining
over teacher evaluations. This appears to be good news. In theory,
management can unilaterally implement reforms without union input
or obstacles. However, as discussed in the f(>llowing section, the
exclusion of unions may not have the intuitive ctkct of improving
teacher evaluations and, ultinutely, teacher quality. It may actually
become more difficult.

D. The Paradox oFPublic Sector Barg;uin.ng in Teacher Evaluation
A paradox exists in public sector labor bargaining when courts or
legislan1rcs seck exclusive control over a bargaining subject, such as
teacher cvaluations.40 On its bee, this prohibition would seem to
improve the democratic cflcct of negotiations because its gives
almost exclusive discretion to the elected school board. However,
when unions arc excluded, they f(xus their resources on blocking the
implementation of rd(>rms through the mechanisms available to
thcm. 41 Thus, regulations meant to tighten the link between elected
otlicials and policy actually work to weaken them.
The f(>llowing example illustrates the paradoxical dlcct. A school
board may contemplate increasing the length of a school day. During
subsequent negotiations, unions f(>eus on bargaining "the bread and
butter" issues relative to the subjcct, 42 devoting energy and resources
to discussions concerning overtime compensation or the exact length
of the extended day and not the content of the policy or program. In
this way, they can undermine proposed or imposed rcf(>rm. The
policy can die by "a death of a thousand cuts." However, this is the
essential point: union exclusion from developing policy that atlccts
employment promotes union ctl(>rts to exert influence over the issue
through other means, such as impact bargaining. The practical cflcct
is that the policy is undercut and cfl(>rts by elected school boards arc
frustrated. Paradoxically, the hoped-for democratic cflCct IS
diminished-not enhanced-by excluding unions from bargaining.
I Iowcvcr, there is ~1 solution.
Indeed, greater--not lessinvolvement by unions in policy-crafting promotes dcmocracy.43
Union involvement can pay particular rewards if it begins when

40.

Mellin, supr:1 note I.

41.

!d.
!d. at
!d. at

42.
43.

1390.
1391.
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discussion of an issue first takes placc. 44 In other words, when unions
have "some skin in the game" from the start, they arc invested in the
policy's success. They can also f(xus their cff()rts on the merits of the
policy. In the end, this assists management in implementing a policy
with less union resistance. Malin argues that "It Ihere is good reason
to believe th~lt g1vmg employees, through their unions, an
institutional voice in the initial decision making will increase the
likelihood that they will become agents of~ instead of obstructions to,
dkctive ch~mge."4S
Research in psychology and human resource management, as
well as literature in education professional development support this
position.46 The professional development liter~lhlrc takes the position
that teachers must be active agents in rd(ml1 and that policy
implemented through top-down management is doomed f()r
hilure.47 Thus, research in psychology and education support the
contention that more union inclusion in the policy development of
teacher evaluations may be the key to implementing rd(mn with
respect to teacher evaluations.4X
Significantly, Malin identified the paradox bcfhrc these most
recent amendments regarding teacher evaluations took dkct. 49 A Lnv
and policy analysis using this lens is more critical than ever, given the
recent change of events. If there is a paradox dkct, prohibiting
negotiations over teacher evaluations may undercut legislative dt()rts
to improve teacher evaluations. Consequently, alternatives to the
wholesale exclusion of unions in teacher evaluations ought to be
examined.

44. /d.
45. ld
46. M;llin,

supr;I note I, at 1391-'!2. Sec e.g., judith
School Nctll'ork Tics: l'rwpcct,· fin· School Improvement, 6

Littk, !'rok,sionil rc;trning ;tnd
j. Enuc. CIIA:-\l;E 277, 277-2'!1

(2005).
47. l.ittk, supra note 46.
4X. !d Sec ;i/m M,llin, supr;I note I, at I "'!S-1 "97 (highlighting mtmerous exampks
where unions ;\1\d matugement have collaborated).
4'!. M.1lin\ The l'aradox ofl'uhlic Sector Li/){}r Lm· was published in 200'!. 5/x note
I, suj>U. The amendments to collective bargaining statutes thar impacted teacher evaluation
rook place, ti>r the most part, after that. Sec, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 111.70-111.77 (2011)
(;\mended through Act 10 of the 2011 Wisconsin LegislatutT). Sec ;i/m jason Stein er ;tl.,
Wilker Stj:ns Ht"~"ct Hill, r<;":Ii (/t;i/lmgcs }vfount, joURNAL SENTJ:-.JEI. (M,lr II, 20 II),
http:/ jwww. jsonline .com/news/statepolitics/1177'!X I "3.html
(documenting
(;ovemor
W.1lkn\ signing of Act I 0 in March of 20 II).
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III. NARROWING THE SCOPE: CHANGES TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING LAWS FROM SELECTED STATES

This section discusses recent changes to collective bargaining and
education st~ltutes that impact union involvement in teacher
cv~1luations. To discuss the recent changes, this section will profile
four states: Wisconsin, Horida, Michigan, and New Hampshire. The
first three states now prohibit negotiations over the process and
substance of teacher evaluations, so whereas in the t(mrth state
negotiations arc permitted. s 1 New Hampshire's classification system
is discussed because it may provide a legal framework to promote the
effective and democratic implemcnt~1tion of teacher evaluations. 52

A. Wisnmsin
In March of 20 ll, the Wisconsin legislature amended its
collective bargaining statute-the Municipal Employee Relations Act
("MERA")-through the "Budget Repair BiiJ."S3 Despite vocal
opposition from public sector unions, including teachers, and court
challcngcs, 54 the measure p<lsscd and became ctlcctivc in June of
2011. ss The bill altered labor-management relations in significant
ways.S 6 In particular, the scope of issues subject to bargaining was
drastically narrowed to one. The applicable statute, as amended,
reads:

SO. WIS. STAT. § 111.70(4J(mb) (2011) (Wisconsin st;ltutc prohibiting bargaining
over an1·thing but hc1sc wages); FLA. STAT.§ 1012.34(1)(a) (2011) (Florida stature giving
district superintendent exclusive control over teachn evaluations); MICII. COM!'. L1\WS §
423.21 S( 3) (I) ( 20 II) (Michigcm statute prohibiting bargaining over teacher evcduations). New
I Llmpshirc\ public sector bargaining statutes docs contain similar prohibitions. N.H. REV.
STi\T. A:\N. § 273-A:I ctSC<J. (2011).
S I .~(·c supr:znotc 37.
S2. .~(·c discussion Iizli:z Part IV where a two-tier solution to the paradox is
ITC<JI111llended.
S3. WIS. SLIT.§§ 111.70-111.77 (2011 ).
S4. .Si:c, e.g., John Nichols, vViq·onsin /ll<~t.;c Rules W:zlkcr\- Anti-Lzhor Lzw "Null :11/d
!'oid," TilE NATJO:--.: (Sept. 12, 2012 ), http://www.rhenation.com/blogjl6<Jl)6X/wisconsinjudge-rulcs-wcllkcrs-anti-lab<>r-Llw-null-and-void# (cl<>eumcnting union pn>tests and court
challenges to collective bargaining law changes).
SS. Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, Act 10 § 24S (codified at WIS. STAT. §
111. 70(4 )(mb) (20 II)) (prohibiting bargaining over anv subject other than total base wages).
S6. ,kc, e.g., WIS. STAr. § 111.70(3g) (2011) (prohibiting em plovers ti-om
withholding union dues).

lJ

APPLYING THE "PARADOX" THEORY
l'rohihitcd subjects o(harg;zining
The municipal employer is prohibited from bargaining colkctivdy
with ~l collective harg~1ining unit containing a general municipal
employee with respect to any of the t(Jllowing:
I. Am· hcror or omdition or cmp/(~vmcnt except wages, which
includes onlv total base wages and excludes any other
compens~nion, which includes, hut is not limited to, overtime,
premium pay, merit pay, pert(mlunce pay, supplemental
compensation, pay schedules, ~md automatic pay progressions. S7

Because only "total base wages" arc negotiable, tC<Khcr
evaluations arc now a prohibited subject of bargaining.sx Even if
111<1nagcmcnt wants to discuss teacher evaluations with the union
during negotiations, it is prohibited from doing so.59
The reclassification of teacher evaluations changes prior law and
pr<Kticc. Indeed, bd(xc 2011, ccrt<lin clements of teacher evaluations
were negotiable. for example, usc of student achievement scores in
evaluations was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 6 0 Assistance
offered to underperforming teachers, such as professional growth
plans or professional development, was also once a permissive subject
of barg<1ining. 61 However, Wisconsin currently prohibits negotiation
regarding il11_!' component of a teacher evaluation system. Thus, a
school board can elect to include an evaluation system that includes
student perfC:mnancc on standardized tests without consulting the
Ul11011.

In place of local negotiations, the state Department of Public
Instruction ("DPI") has assumed a prominent role in teacher
evaluations. 62 Recently, D PI convened a task f(xcc that issued

S7.

sx.

!d § 111.70(4)(mh) (emplusis added).
1d

S9. Adherence to this exclusion m<lY he awkward in <l practiul sense. Simply as a nuttn
of good practice, <ldministration and teachers discuss evaluation procedures and requirements.
At what poim might organic discussions between managemem and reachers concerning
n·aluatiom 1:!11 into "negotiations"1 Moreover, how would such a violation he ent(>rced1 If
discussions wem too br, would nun<lgcmcnt threaten to tile an unbir labor practice ag<linst the
union> The unimended consequences of this arc unclear.
60. Wis. STAT.§§ I IX.22S, 111.70(2)(o) (2009).
61. Beloit Educ Ass'n v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 242 N.W.2d 231 (Wis.
1976).
62. WIS. FRAMEWORK !'OR EllUCATOR EITF<:TIVFKESS, PREL!tv\1:--JAR Y REPORT &
RECOM,\IE:'-Jili\TIONS
(2011),
<li'<JJ!ah/c
<It
http://cc.dpi. wi.g<l\'/iiksjec/pdf/ee _report_prclim.pdf Iherein<lher l'RFI ,L\I!Ni\R Y RFI'< JRT I
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recommendations regarding teacher evaluations f()r districts. 63
Student perf(mnance is a centerpiece of teacher evaluations under the
recommendations. 64 In fKt, the task f()rce explicitly adopts valueadded modeling ("V AM") as ~l means to measure teacher
eftcctiveness. 65 As discussed later in this section, V AM is
controversial. In brief~ V AM purports to statistically measure a
teacher's contribution to a student's individual growth, primarily by
measuring student scores on standardized tests. 6 6 The notion is that a
teacher's contribution to a shldent's learning can be statistically
isolated_67 The Wisconsin task f()rce "recommends" that at least 50(J1J
of a teacher's evaluation be derived from student assessments, such as
standardized test scores.

H. Hmidz
Like Wisconsin, florida law now prohibits bargaining over
teacher evaluations. 6 1l By virtue of recent statutory amendments,
development and implementation of teacher evaluations is now
vested exclusively with the superintendent of a district. The
~1pplicable stahJte now reads:
For the purposes of increasing student learning growth by
improving the quality of instructional, administrative, and
supervisory services in the public schools of the state, the district
school superintendent shall establish procedures for evaluating the
pert(mnance of duties and responsibilities of all instructional,
administrative, and supervisory personnel employed by the school
district. 69

63. To be sUIT, state union organizations were parr of the task t(>rce, along with a
myricld of other stclkeholdcrs. Howen:r, this inclusion docs not obviate the need f(>r local
involvement in teacher evaluations.
64. 5(·e i'RFI.IM!Ni\R Y REPORT, Sllj)J;znotc 62.
65. 5(·e 1d. at 6.
66. William L. Sanders & Sandra 1'. Hom, Research 1-iizdings limn the J(·nnessee
!":due-Added
Assnsmcnt St:,tcm (TVAAS) /)atah:zse: fmplicwims lin· h'duczrimul
F!·;z/u.wim ;znd Rcscczrch, 12 ).l'ERS. EVAI.UATIO:\ EllUC. 247 (l'l'lll).
67. /d.
61l. I lowcvcr, unlike in Wisconsin, the lcgislarivc acrivitv occurred prinurilv in the .u-ca
of the state's education code, not in its labor rclatiot\s stature. Regardless, the dkct is rhc same
in both stares.
69. FIASTAT.Si 1012.34(l)(a)(2011).
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Making the superintendent the sole keeper of evaluation
procedures is a shift in policy in florida. Prior to the mactmcnt of
the above statute, unions and management negotiated teacher
evaluations as a mandatory subJ'cct of bargaining. 70
State control over teacher evaluations, therd(>rc, has increased.
Indeed, the Florida legislature prescribed essential components of the
teacher evaluation system, notwithstanding the superintendent's
duties. Law requires that district evaluation policies usc student
pcrf(m11~mcc and the controversial V AM in determining teacher
dkctivcncss. 71 Indeed, at least half of a pcrf(>rmancc evaluation must
be based on "student learning growth" as measured by state or
district asscssmcnts.7 2 Moreover, the state mandates th~lt districts
create a salary schedule to link teachers' s~1larics to their perf(>rmance
on the new teacher evaluation systcm.7 3 Ultimately, the state
Dcp~lrtmcnt of Education oversees each district's evaluation plan.74
In sum, like Wisconsin, florida's new law governing teacher
evaluations dkctivcly precludes union involvement. Teacher
evaluation policies and procedures arc expressly reserved f(>r the
superintendent. Additionally, the state legislature requires that any
evaluation system developed at the local level must include the usc of
student test scores. 7S
•

L

L

C Michigan
In 2011, the Michigan legislature prohibited teacher evaluation
bargaining. The applicable statute reads as t(JIIows:

70. The Florida Education Association (a N EA affiliate) Ius tiled suit challenging the
constitmionality of the new evaluation system. The Association argues thclt the system
intcrkrcs with Florida\ Constitution, which guarantees employees the right to bargain over
wages, hours, and conditions of emplovment. Sec Complaint tin· lkcbratorv c\Ild Injunctive
Relief, Robinson v. Robinson (Ha. Cir. Ct. 2011) (No. 2011 CA2S26), ;zv.u/;zh/c ;zr
http://www .mC\Trbn ">kslaw .c< >m/d< >euments/ R< >hi 1IS< >11% 20vs ')-(,20 R< >hi liS< m/
Robinson_ v_ Robinson_ Complaim.pdf (last visited December S, 20 II) Ihereinc1ti:er
Complaint 171. I'IA STAT.§ 1012.34(3) (2011 ). ScCJd § 1012.22.
72. !d.§ 1012.34(3)(a) (emphasis added).
73. !d § 1012.22(1)(c)(S).
74. !d § 1012.34(1 )(b).
7S. lmporuntlv, the federal government played the role of the not-so-invisible lund in
l'loridcl; the new evaluation and compensation timnulas were developed in connection with
Floricb\ Race to the Top grant. FI.A. DFI''T Of' EllUC., RFVIEW AND APPROVAl. CIIECki.IST
f'OR
RTTT
TEACIIFR
EVAI.UATIO:--:
SYSTEMS
(20 II),
c!Vclll!hlc
cit
http:/ jwww. tld< >e.< >rg/clrr<l( I'ecJCher E \'<\ lm ti< mSvsrems.c1sp.
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Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a
bargaining representative of its employees shall not include ~my of
the following subjects:
Decisions about the development, content, standards, procedures,
adoption, and implementation of a public school employer's
perfi:n-mance evaluation system . . . , decisions concerning the
content of pcrfim1unce evaluation of an employee . . . , or the
impact of those decisions on an individual employee or the
bargaining unit. 76

The legislature also cn~Ktcd several other laws that impact teacher
evaluations.
Like florida, Michigan law now requires the usc of VAM in
teacher evaluations. 77 Indeed, "student growth" must be a
"significant Elctor" in individual pcrf(mnancc evaluations. n Student
growth is defined by statute in value-added tcrms?9 Districts must
develop a compensation plan that accounts t()r teacher
pcrt()rmancc.XO Additionally, teacher pcrf()rmancc is the "nujority
LKtor" in making RIF dccisions.X 1 Length of service cannot be
considered. In sum, teachers arc excluded from bargaining in some of
the most important and consequential areas aflccting their working
conditions: how they arc evaluated and rewarded f()r their job.
This was a remarkable hlrn of events in Michigan, as teacher
evaluations had previously been a mandatory subject of bargaining. X2
Moreover, as in Florida, in place of local solutions, the state passed
highly prescriptive laws concerning the content and usc of
evaluations. X3 However, the process and substance of a teacher

76. M!Cil. COM!'. LAWS~ 423.215(3)(1) (2011) (emphasis added).
77. 20 II Mich. Pub. Acts 102 (codified at MICII. CoM!'. LAW~ 1249( I )(c) (20 II)).
7X.

!d

79. ld (ddining student growth as measured bv national, state, and district test LbU or
other objective criteria).
XO. !:'lorida and Michigan otkr a subtle comparison with respect to the usc of student
perlt>n1UJKe in teacher evaluations. In !:'lorida, student perf(mnancc must ,\ccount h>r 'lt least
50'Yt> of a teacher evaluation plan.
XI. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 102 (codified at MICII. COM!'. L'\W ~ 124X(I)(b)(i)
(2011)).
X2. Cent. Mich. liniv. Faculty Ass'n v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 273 N.W.2d 21 (Mich.
197X) (tinding an unbir labor practice when university unilatcrallv adopted ev<1luation
procedures rhat added student evaluations as a bctor t(>r teacher eflcetivencss beCJuse it was a
mandatory subject of bargaining).
X3. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 102 (coditicd ar MICII. CoM!'. LAW ~~ 124X-49 (2011))
(requiring teacher peli(>rmance as a bctor in bvoff decisions and setting the substance of
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evaluation is pcrmissivc.X 4 Importantly, teacher evaluations' impact
on wages, hours, and terms of employment is likely mambtory. xs
The state's Labor Bo~1rd stated that "if the implementation of the
unilaterally, non-negotiated evaluation program impacts the terms
and conditions of evaluations then there must be negotiations about
this change to those terms and conditions of cmploymcnt."X 6
Because the impact remains mandatory, it might be suggested that
the situation is ripe fc:>r unions to undermine implementation of a
teacher evaluation policy, pursuant to the par~1dox dlcct. X7

D. New I l;zmpshirc
A decision set forth bv the New Hampshire Public Employee
Labor Relations Board ("PELRB") strikes the proper balance f<>r
union involvement and management control. In A.~:mo:ztion o{
Portsmouth/NbA -NH t'. Port~mouth School ])iwict, PELRB
established important checks and balances on unions and
simultaneously encouraged management to involve unions. XX U ndcr
this dccision,X<J management need not bargain with unions when
negotiations over evaluations do any of the f(>llowing:

( l)
(2)
( 3)
(4)

Restrict the int(mnation the district considers;
Set the standards the district will apply in evaluating employees;
Control the district's actions with the evaluations;
Address changes the district needs to implement to the
ev~1luation; or

tcKhcr pcrl(mnancc evaltution to include student growth data).
X4. Appeal of White Mountain Reg'! Sch. Dist., <JOX A.2d 7<JO, 7')5 (N.I I. 2006 ); In rc
Pittslidd Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 5<J4, 5<J6-<J7 (I <J<J<J).
HS. Con-Val Educ. Ass'n v. Con-V.tl Sch. Dist., Dec. 2000-116 (N.H. Pub. Emp.
Ltbor RcLttions Bd.) (Nov. S, 2000). 5(·c ;i/m Appeal of N.H., 647 A.2d 1302, 1306-07
(N.H. I<J<J4) (although deciding to otter extracurricular programs is the district's mamgerial
prerog.tti\T, "wages, hours, and other specifics of stall' obligations ;tnd remuneration primarily
ath:ct the terms ;tnd conditions of employment.")
X6. Con-Val Educ. Ass'n v. Con-V.tl Sch. Dist., Ike. 2000-116 (N.H. Pub. Emp.
Ltbor Rdation.s Bd.) (Nov. S, 2000).
X7. Malin, supr.1 note I.
XX. Ass'n of Portsmouth Tcachers/NFA-NH v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 200X025 (N.H. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd.) (Feb 15, 200X).
X<J. Of course, administr.ttivc decisions arc not precedenti;tl. Regardless, this is the
current state of th<" bw in New Hampshin:. Moreover, the author contends that this decision
has struck ;til importam babtH"<' in terms of limiting union ability to imp;tct bargain over
reacher evalu.ttions while ;tt the same time encouraging the union to dunnd th<"ir efti1rts ;tnd
resources to\\'ard the merits of the policv, rath<"r tlun its emplovment consequences.
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( 5) Address the nature of evaluators' personnel contact or
observation of employeesY 0

The PortmJOuth decision places significant limitations on a
union's ability to undermine teacher evaluations through impact
bargaining. Indeed, the usc of evaluation results with respect to
employment decisions remain under management discretion, given
the restrictions set f(>rth in Portmwuth. The district has unfettered
discretion in terms of the inf(>rmation that it may consider. Thus,
unions cmnot usc bargaining simply to protect employee rights.
Stripped of this ability, unions must, thcrcf(>rc, address the merits of
the issue.
Malin suggests that this type of involvement will avoid the
paradox.'" If unions make thoughtful proposals, management must
negotiate proposals to the extent that terms and working conditions
arc atlCctcd.<J2 The legal framework tlmncls union cfl(>rts toward
positive involvement in teacher evaluations. It channels union cft(>rts
into positive rcf(m11, rather than simply protectionist strategies.

E. Putt1i1g It All Together: Trends· and Pofi(y Implications
Several trends emerged in the states analyzed in this Article.
These arc identified below, along with their policy implications.
first, the paradox of public sector labor is perpetuated by the recent
amendments concerning teacher evaluations and bargaining in the
states examined (with the exception of New I lampshirc). Wisconsin,
florida, and Michigan have all excluded unions from bargaining the
issue at the local level. Consequently, unions will f(xus on protecting
employees' rights rather than education rcf(>rm and the improvement
of schools.<J3 This may occur through impact bargaining (where
applicable) or other means, such as increased litig~ltion_'.l4
The effects arc already evident. The florida National Education
Association ("NEA") has challenged the various amendments
concerning the collective bargaining rights of teachers, including
those related to teacher evaluations. NEA argues that these
amendments violate a state constitutional right to bargain.%
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.

9S.

Ass/1 o!Porwnouth Tcnha1, Ike. No. 200X-025.
Malin, supr;~notc I, at 1391.
!d.
Sccp,mcnJ!IJ- 1d.
!d
Complaint, .\1/f't:l note 70. Sec ;Jim Kcyonna Summers, Two l'Ii1<-lbs loduc;Jton

11
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Rdkcting the paradox theory, NEA has channeled its energy into
dismantling the lcgislation.<J 6 This is precisely the opposite result
needed if effective teacher evaluation rd(xm is to be
implemcntcd'J7-an unintended consequence of excluding unions
from teacher evaluation discussions.
Second,
these
amendments
~liter
the
dvnamics
of
intergovernmental power. State-level government now plays a more
active role in the process and substance of teacher evaluations. Of
course, this varies in terms of degree. The New Hampshire and
Wisconsin Dcp~lrtmcnts of Education have made "recommendations"
f(>r tc~Khcr cv~lluations. Horida and Michigan have mambtcd that a
teacher cvalu~ltion process include certain clements, such as the usc of
VAM. However, state requirements on localities may very well be
unfunded mandates. Moreover, the not-so-invisible hand of federal
influence over this power shift cannot be understated. In florida and
Michigan, changes to teacher evaluation were prompted explicitly by
those states' pursuit of Race to the Top (" R TTT") fundsYX
Third, these amendments do not address the larger problems
associated with the current state of teacher evaluations. The primary
issue is how administrators E1il to usc teacher evaluation systems
properly. Indeed, administrators' misapplication of cxis·ting
evaluation systems explains many problems with improving teacher
qu~1liryY<J A recent policy brief noted that 73% of teacher evaluations
did not contain recommendations t(x improvcmcnt. 100 Moreover,

Amoni.: JlJose J:zktizg on New Texher f"l';//1/;/tion Lzw, Ti\,vll'i\ BAY TL\1FS (Ocr. I 0, 20 II),
hrrp: /jwww. tam paha \' .C< >m/nt>ws/
cducation/tcachns/;lrtidc II <J60 14.eLT (profiling the dulkngc of six educators and l'loriLb
N EA to teKher e\·aluation changes).
<J6. Summers, supt:znotc <JS.
<J7. Malin, supr.z note I, at 13')3 (noting the successhil impkmcnt;ltion of innovative
teacher e\'aluation svstems where unions ha\'e ;\ voict> in the process).
<JX. .S(·e, e.g., Ha. lkp't of Educ., hnzl .s(·ope ot' Work TempLzte, RACE TO Tl!E To!'
(;R.\1\:T AR< '!liVE, http://www.tldoe.org/arrajRacnotht>Top-archi\'c.asp (last \'isited Dec. 22,
2012) (n< >ting that Horida had met riK requirt>nKnt of rd(>rming its teacher evaluation system
to s;1tisfv riK rcquiremems of the RTIT grams) ..Six ;z/w Mich. Educ. Ass'n, New
RC<JIIirement,·

fi JJ'

Tczcher

l:'v;z/iutions,

http://www .nK;l.< >rg/pd/cntiticltionfnew_e\';lluation_rt>quiremcms.html (last \'isited I )cc. 22,
2012) (noting th;\t the re;lson t(>r legislative changt>s to the evaluatio11 S\'stem W;ls t(>r
Michiga11's RTTT gr;mt.).
<J<J. S<·e, e.g., Mark Paige, Texher Fvaluation Rcfimn: Finding the h>rest Through the
Trees,
TENIIERS
Coli..
REc.
(2011),
http:/fwww .ru-cn >rd.org/( :, mtent.asp1< :om,-mld = 16SX2.
100. Da11icl Weisberg cr ;ll., llze Wi<{t;ct Ffkct, TilE N~"WTEACIIERS l'ROIF<:T (200<J),
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according to teachers, of evaluations containing recommendations,
only 45% of the recommendations were usd1!1. 101 This is because
administrators tend to look to evaluations when they arc considering
employment termination and not the improvement of a teacher's
individual capacity. 102 Such consequences call into question the
wisdom of state legislatures developing prescriptive procedures and
policies for administrators. furthermore, there is no evidence
suggesting that administr~ltors will abide by the prcscnpnvc
procedures set fiJrth by the legislature. As noted above,
administrators tend to ignore the evaluation process. 103 Thus, a
tlmdamcntal issue with implementing dlcctive teacher evaluations is
not so much the appropriate system or data (e.g., whether to include
V AM or not), but the human application of evaluations.
hnally, the usc of V AM-employed in Wisconsin, florida, <ll1d
Michigan-is riddled with problems. YAM has been described as a
way to statistically isolate the dlcct of a teacher on a student's growth
over the course of time. I 04 The validity of V AM models is
questionable and has engendered a serious debate among scholars.
Indeed, many argue that V AM models cannot account for the myriad
of demographic and social variables (e.g., poverty) that atkct student
achicvement. 10 5 Because of this, many caution against the usc of
V AM in high-stakes issues like employment termination. 106 Yet the
lcgislahJres profiled here have largely ignored these warnings with
their prescriptive ~1mcndmcnts. Instead, they have f()isted V AM on
local districts, leaving districts to sort out the complications. Such
disregard may lead to suspicion over the integrity of the evaluative
process and, potentially, more litigation.

IV. A WAY

OUTCWTHE PARADOX

This section recommends a two-tiered approach to escape the
and improve teacher evaluations. first, it suggests that

par~HJox

;W;zi!:Jhlc ;zt http://widgctctkct.org/.
101. ld
102. !d
I 03. /d.
I 04. Sanders & Horn, Sllf>J:znote 66, at 247-256.
I 05. Xiaoxia A. Newton et a!., \/;z/uc-;zddcd Jt1odcliJ~f; o{ Tcxhcr Ffli:crilnJc.\s: An
h:IJ'for;ltl(m o(Su!>Jlitr Aoo.1s Jlfodc/1· ;znd ()mtcxt,·, Ell. l'oL'Y ARC! liVES (Sept. 10, 20 I 0 ),
;z 1;zj/;zZ,/c .It http://cpaa.asu.edu/ojs/ article/view/X I 0.
I 06. Hc.nhcr Hill, Fl·;z/u;ning Value Added ,H{)(k-1\: A Vzlidin· A1gumcnt AJ'f'ro;zch, 2X
).l'oL'Y A:--.:ALYSIS & Mc;MT. 6'J2, 700-709 (2009).
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jurisdictions adopt a legal framework that incorporates union
involvement in tC<Khcr evaluations. New Hampshire law might be a
useful framework t<>r incorporating union involvement in teacher
evaluations, <1S it succcsstldly balances ma1ugcmcnt prcrog<1tivcs
while channeling union energy in a positive manner. Second, <1
structural framework that t<>sters mutual collaboration must <1lso exist
<1t the local level. Employing IBB can cflcctuatc this. This nontradition<11 appnuch to negotiation can be an cfkctive means of
building rcbtionships and collaboration so that rcf(>rms can be
promoted rather than undermined by unions.

A. A tm(!IiJg the Paradox Through ;J Legal Structure
An appropriate legal structure is <1 necessary precondition f(>r
<Woiding the paradox. 10 7 This legal structure must be guided by
several important principles, giving employees a collective and
institutio1ul voice in the proccss. 10 X It should <11low unions and
teachers to share the risk of any policy.I09 It should channel union
efforts in a positive manner. In sum, employees should be invested in
the final policy product.ll O
One obvious legal solution may be classifying teacher evaluations
as a mandatory subject of bargaining. This, of course, comes with
risk t(>r management. School districts may rightly tear that simply
making the topic mandatory will only open the door f(x unions to be
even more vigibnt in erecting obstacles to implementation. This is a
hir criticism. No doubt there arc unions that will usc such a structure
to the advantage of their employees and not schools or students. Ill
There may be a way around the paradox by making teacher
cvalll<ltions permissive and not mandatory, as is the case in New
llampshire.
The New Hampshire legal framework militates against the
"paradox of public bbor law."ll2 Indeed, it pushes management and
I 07. Malin, supo note I, at I 39:-l (noting that the legal structure make'
clunncling cfl(>rt' in a positive nunncr).
lOX. !d. at 1391.
I 09. !d.
I 10.

.1

difference in

!d.

II I. !d. at 139:-l (noting that there will alwavs be unions who will u'e the legal structure
to "obstruct the government entitv's mission").
112. !d. .tt 1393 ("Whn1 the union serves as .1 vehicle t<>r collective emplovee \'OilT in the
eLtltution ctnd discipline of cmplovecs, the union em be transt(>rmed from an impediment of
cfl(xtin· gm·crnmcnt imo a contributor.").
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unions together to bargain teacher evaluations. first of all, the law
permits bargaining of the subjcct.II3 Moreover, the law encourages
management to exercise this option because impact bargaining of
teacher evaluation is mandatory. from management's perspective, it
would be inefficient to construct a teacher evaluation system only to
sec it undermined through union impact bargaining, which is ~l likely
occurrence when unions arc excluded from the initial discussions of a
policy. 114 The more prudent route is for both sides to engage at the
beginning of the proccss.II5
Indeed, the law encourages such an approach, especially on the
part of unions. This is primarily because of the limitations set forth in
the Portsmouth Labor Board dccision. 11 6 Such limitations create a
disincentive f()r unions to overreach through impact bargaining. If
they do, they run the risk of management being able to shut them
out completely. As discussed, unions cannot do any of the f()llowing:
"seck to restrict" inf()rmation the district will consider; "set the
standards" the district will usc; "control" the action the district may
take with an evaluation; address any changes in the policy that the
district nuy "need" to make; or address the "nature and extent" of
contact or observation of employccs. 11 7 Thus, unions would be wise
to engage in discussions at the development phase of the evaluation
discussions, rather than play defense through impact barg~1ining
under these restrictions.
In sum, New Hampshire law provides a usdid platf(H·m f()r
management and unions to f()rmally construct teacher cv~1luations
through negotiations. It sets a necessary condition to prevent the
paradox of public sector bargaining from arising with respect to
teacher evaluation rcfc:>rm. An appropriate legal framework sets
f:worablc circumstances f()r collaboration.Illl More is required,
however. Unions and management must trust one another and both
be invested in the final product of any negotiations, whether f(m1ul
or infi:mnal. Thus, the conditions at the bargaining table must
113. Appeal of White Moumain Reg'l Seh. Dist., 901l A.2d 790,795 (N.H. 2006); In rc
l'ittslield Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 594, 596-97 (I 999).
114. M.11in, supra note I, clt 1370.
115. !d. at 1391 (giving institutional voice in the initd decision-making increases the
chances that unions become "agems of change").
116. Ass'n of Portsmouth Teaehers/NEA-NH v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 2001l025 (N.H. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd.) (feb 15, 2001l).
117. !d.
!Ill. Malin, sup1~1 note I, at l39H.
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both sides in this direction. To do this, an alternative to
the typical "horse trading" type of b<lrgaining should be explored.

H. Intcrcst-IJ;zscd Barpuiui1g: A Solution to rhc Ru:zdox ;It the Local

Len_'/
IBB, an innovative approach to bargaining, may be the
appropriate mechanism for bargaining teacher evaluations at the
ground lcvcl. 119 IBB tixuscs on building relationships through
ncgoti~uions. 12o It recognizes that parties to a negotiated agreement
must live and work under that agreement. Thus, the bargaining
process should t()stcr positive relationships between union ~md
management. It stands in contrast to traditional "positional
b~1rgaining that can be hostile to education rd(xm."l2I
I BB t(Kuscs negotiations on the merits of an issue. I 22 Through
negotiations, it identifies the issues to be discussed. It sets objective
criteria to measure solutions to the issue. Both parties brainstorm
possible solutions to the issue. This ditkrs from typical positional
bargaining, where each side attempts to maximize its interest at the
expense of the other. IBB suggests that both parties should jointly
resolve shared problems. In this way, labor-management relations arc
enhanced through the bargaining process.
An cx~1mplc of IBB applied in district negotiations might be as
follows. I 23 Management may bring to the table the issue of adopting
or rdim11ing the district's teacher evaluation process. Management
and unions would jointly establish objective criteria to measure
I j<)_

c,g,, B,\RRY BLUESTONE & Ti!Wv!AS KOCIIAN, TOII'AR!l :\ NE\\' GIUNil
COLL\IHlRXI'I\'E AI'PROACIIFS TO L\BOR-MAN:\ld-:,\1ENT RFFORM 1:\
MASSAU!l!SFITS (20 I I), .ll':lll.z/>lc ;It http://www,northeastern_cdujdukakiscentcr/wpc<mtcnt/upl<>adsjl;rand_ Bargain_ Report, pdf (recommt:IKling the ad<>ptions of IBB )120_ .~(·c R<K;!',R FISCIIFR & Wli.LIAM lJRY, (;c:niNl; TO YES: NH;OI!XriNl;
AldZEFME~T WITIIOUT GIV!Nl; It\ (Penguin Books I <JHI ).
I 21. .kc, <'}!·· DEMITC!II'LL, supr:J note 24 (noting that "I e lducation rdillm must p.1ss
through the rigors of.1 colkctivc bargaining table in which tr:1dcoffs arc commonplace").
122. FIS<IIFR & UR Y, supr.Jnote 120, :It xviii.
12"- IBB\ guiding principles havt: been described as t<>Ilows. First, negotiators must
distinguish between the "people" .llld the" problem." Thcv must attend to the human :lSJKct of
b.1rgaining (e.g., human <:motions) and also, separately, the suhstami1T merit of a probkm.
Second, negoti.uions must keep an eve on the imcrests of the parties and not simplv their
positiom. The assumption here is th:1t there may he slured interests that, once rewalcd, kad to
colkctive solutiom to a given problem. Third, parties must be creative and invcm options to .1
prohkm. In other words, sides should brainstorm potcmi:ll solutions. In doing so, thcv ma1·
tind :1 mc.llls to s:!tisi\· their mutual interests. Fourth, all proposals should be measured agaimt
objectiiT critcri.l. .kc 1d
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possible solutions. Such criteria might ask whether a proposed
solution docs any of the following: ( 1) improves tc~Khcr
effectiveness; (2) is flir to employees; or (3) provides necessary
resources t(x both management and employees. Both parties would
brainstorm potential solutions that address the problem and also can
be measured against these criteria. Thus, management and unions
would constructively and positively address the problcm.l24
IBB provides a local roadmap that can complement the right
legal framework in finding a way out of the paradox. Through IBB,
both unions and management become invested in an agreement at its
initial stagcs.l2S IBB helps the parties share the risk. Indeed, through
IBB, both parties ~1rc central to crafting the final product. IBB also
promotes relationship-building that might further union and
management collaboration as teacher evaluations arc implemented.
Indeed, IBB starts from the premise that negotiations arc a tool in
creating good relationships, not simply a means to create a contract.
Thus, IBB acts as a natural complement to a legal framework that
encourages collaboration, rather than prohibits it.

V.

CONCLUSION

Like blindtc>ldcd partygocrs swmgmg at a piilata, state
legislatures took multiple swipes at their respective collective
bargaining laws in 2011. Indeed, with a swift crack, they eviscerated
the collective bargaining rights of tc~Khcrs. The area of teacher
evaluations was particularly impacted. In Wisconsin, ~lorida, and
Michigan, the issue of teacher evaluations is now a prohibited subject
of bargaining. Conventional wisdom suggests that management is
now free to implement ctlcctivc teacher evaluation systems and
rctcmn. Like candy E1lling from the piiiata, teacher cvahution rctc>rm
is now unencumbered.
Yct these changes could undermine teacher evaluation rctcm11.
Management will have less control over the process, rather than
more. The paradox of public sector labor law will create this ctlcct.
As unions and their membership arc excluded from barg~1ining
teacher evaluations, unions will become more vigilant in protecting
124. The author recognizes that there arc circumstances where the relationship between
the parties will not sustain such collaboration and may not be appropriate.
l2S. l\1,\lin, supra note I, at l3lJl (noting the importance of involving unions in the
initials phases of policv development so as to avoid the paradox).
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their employees when management mismanages the evaluation
system. In other words, the recent reforms with respect to
evaluations arc backward.
Going fl:>rward, legislatures would do right to permit
management and unions to negotiate teacher evaluations. This can be
done with appropriate constraints to protect against union overreach,
~1s in New Hampshire. Including teachers will develop employee buyin, increase employees' personal investment in job pertl:m1unce, and
promote labor pe~Ke. In sum, using the hlw to promote more union
involvement in teacher evaluation discussions makes fl:>r good
education policy.

